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INTRODUCTION  
Over the past 15 years, India has experienced separatist challenges from a variety of 
ethnic and religious minorities - Sikhs in Punjab, Muslims in Kashmir and various tribal 
groups in Assam and other parts of the Northeast Frontier. Between 1983 and 1993, over 
20,000 people were killed in Punjab, and since 1989 a greater number of people have 
been killed in Kashmir. While the insurgency in Punjab developed slowly between 1978 
and 1984, it crumbled quickly between 1992 and 1994. The insurgency in Kashmir 
continues unabated. In fact, it seems to have been transformed into a proxy war with 
Pakistan.1 These crises have exacted a serious toll on the Indian state.  
Ethnic and religious conflict is not new in South Asia. Indian independence, in fact, was 
achieved amid one of the greatest religious conflicts of the century. The legacy of 
partition in India placed two issues outside the boundaries of acceptable political 
discourse. First, the government of India made clear shortly after independence that 
demands for the political reorganization of the Indian state along religious lines would 
not be entertained. Second, it made equally clear that separatist claims would not be 
tolerated.2 Indeed, the Indian Constitution requires all political candidates and elected 
officials to swear that they will "bear true faith and allegiance to the constitution of India" 
and that they will "uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India."3  
The insurgencies in Punjab and Kashmir over the past 15 years have seriously challenged 
these two fundamental rules of Indian political practice. As such, the government of India 
has moved forcefully to repress these movements. When the normal techniques of 
suppression failed to erode Sikh militancy in the early 1980s, the Indian government 
experimented with a number of ad hoc counter-insurgency strategies before developing a 
"successful" modus operandi in the early 1990s. The government of India has, by and 
large, pursued the same strategy of containment in Kashmir since 1989, but with less 
success. This modus operandi, which will be described below, was employed in each 
case with large social costs and without resolving the fundamental political issues. In 
Kashmir, furthermore, it has not even succeeded in terminating political violence.  
COUNTER-INSURGENCY IN INDIA: TOWARD A MODUS 
OPERANDI  
Over the past 15 years, the government of India has developed a counter-insurgency 
strategy by trial and error. This strategy has a number of components. First, where an 
insurgency materializes the state government is dismissed and direct rule is assumed by 
New Delhi. Second, the central government has tried to avoid open, high-profile counter-
insurgency operations ever since the bungled operation at the Golden Temple in 1984. 
Third, the central government has generally refused to negotiate settlements to these 
crises, preferring instead to fight wars of attrition. Fourth, the problem state is flooded 
with security forces, which attempt to contain militancy within a small geographic area. 
Fifth, the security forces have shown a ruthless determination to eliminate militant 
leaders, while providing leniency for followers. Sixth, the government has been helped 
by the delegitimation of these movements caused by militant excesses; the security forces 
may well have helped facilitate this moral disintegration. Finally, when the government 
feels confident it is winning the war on the battlefield, it moves to restore the democratic 
process with enforced elections. This places a veneer of democratic legitimacy on the 
final push to eradicate militancy in troubled states.  
The Constitutional and Legal Framework  
India is a federal union, but the Constitution equips the central government with 
extraordinary powers, including the right to dismiss democratically elected state 
governments. This is the "normal" method for dealing with obstreperous state 
governments or the breakdown of law and order in particular states. It is made possible 
by Article 356 of the Indian Constitution, which is supposed to be employed only upon 
the assessment of the state governor that the constitutional machinery of the state has 
collapsed. In practice, the central government has been able to invoke Article 356 at 
will.4 It is supposed to be imposed only for six-month increments, although it can be 
renewed up to a maximum of three years. In the Punjab case however, the Constitution 
was amended frequently to extend Article 356 beyond three years.  
When Article 356 is in effect, the state is ruled from New Delhi, under the authority of 
the president. Under President's Rule, the government may violate the constitutional 
freedoms normally guaranteed in Article 19 - the freedoms of speech, association and 
movement - in its effort to restore order. In fact, the 59th Amendment of the Constitution, 
effected on 30 March 1988, served to suspend Article 21 - the right to life - in Punjab. 
This repugnant alteration of the constitution was repealed by the 63rd Amendment, which 
took effect 6 January 1990, but for 21 months the security of the person was not 
guaranteed in Punjab, while the government sought to quell this "internal disturbance."5
In addition to these constitutional powers, the government of India has a wide array of 
repressive legislation at its disposal. The Armed Forces Special Powers Act (1956) 
permits the Army "to arrest suspects, conduct searches, and use lethal force" in "disturbed 
areas." The National Security Act (1980) "authorizes security forces to arrest and detain 
without warrant people suspected of undermining national security, public order, and 
essential economic services." The Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (1967) "empowers 
the government to ban any subversive organization, such as those advocating secession." 
The Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Ordinance (1984) "promulgated in 1984 
with special reference to Punjab, provides for secret tribunals to try terrorists." Finally, 
the now-repealed Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (1985) provided 
the security forces with unprecedented powers of search and seizure. Under the TADA, 
furthermore, suspects were tried in camera and were presumed guilty.6 Harish Puri et al 
report that 14,457 people were "detained without trial" in Punjab under these ordinances 
up to 1993.7  
President's Rule was imposed in Punjab in October 1983, and it remained in effect until 
February 1992, with the brief exception of the period from September 1985 to May 1987. 
When Article 356 was invoked in October 1983, the Congress government in Punjab was 
discredited, and the opposition Akali Dal, the party of Sikh nationalism, was 
marginalized. The two primary democratic forces in the state were thus sidelined. Sikh 
militants, however, were emboldened. Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, the fiery 
religious leader of the militants, had been directing his followers from the guest house of 
the Golden Temple since July 1982. In December 1983, just after the imposition of 
President's Rule, he shifted to the Akal Takht, the seat of Sikh temporal and spiritual 
authority, in the inner sanctum of the Golden Temple. He was joined, furthermore, by his 
armed supporters. The militants continued their campaign from the Akal Takht, 
apparently in the belief that they would not be attacked in a place of religious worship.  
The political dynamics in Punjab at the time were such that the imposition of Article 356 
was ineffective in containing Sikh militancy. The problem in Punjab did not lie with 
elected, democratic political parties. The culprits were extra-parliamentary militants, yet 
it was the government and political parties that were sanctioned. Legitimate political 
space was consequently closed, and the Indian government found itself facing a shadowy, 
underground enemy. While President's Rule was ill-advised and ineffective in Punjab, it 
continues to be the weapon of first strike for the government in these situations. The 
government seems to consider it necessary, if insufficient, to assume direct control of the 
state to restore law and order. 
The Lesson of Operation Bluestar: Avoid High-Profile Military  
Confrontation  
Six months after Bhindranwale moved into the inner sanctum of the Golden Temple, 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi ordered the army to storm the Temple and arrest 
Bhindranwale and his followers. Operation Bluestar, as the attack was code-named, was a 
military and political disaster. The army did not have the military capacity or the 
intelligence necessary to perform the operation. It deployed regular troops for the 
operation, and it initiated the attack with mortar fire in the middle of a crowded city. 
Bhindranwale and his key supporters were killed, as were about 1,000 innocent pilgrims. 
The Temple, furthermore, was heavily damaged. The larger Sikh community was 
devastated by Operation Bluestar. Six months later, Indira Gandhi was assassinated in 
retaliation by two Sikh bodyguards.8
After Operation Bluestar, it was decided that the regular army would not be employed in 
high-profile operations. The regular army was subsequently deployed to secure the state, 
while commandos were trained for special operations. The National Security Guards 
(NSG) was formed in 1985 as an elite anti-terrorist force, and to protect leading public 
figures, and "[i]n 1991, the Army raised a new force, the Rashtriyia (National) Rifles, 
specifically charged to deal with terrorism, rioting, and communal violence. By 1996-97, 
the new force had 40,000 members."9 As the last vestiges of militancy were being 
eradicated in Punjab in 1992-93, the army was deployed to provide a secondary security 
perimeter while the police engaged in most of the actual combat.10 In short, the 
government decided that counter-insurgency had to be as discreet as possible. 
The Lesson of the Longowal Accord: Refuse to Negotiate a Settlement  
After the assassination of Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi replaced his mother as leader of 
the Congress party and as the Prime Minister of India. In the general election the 
following month, he campaigned with rather chauvinistic rhetoric against the Sikhs but, 
after winning the largest majority government in the history of India, he felt confident to 
pursue a more conciliatory strategy. In summer 1985, Rajiv Gandhi struck a deal with 
Sant Harcharan Longowal, a moderate leader of the Akali Dal. The accord included the 
restoration of the democratic process and the transfer of Chandigarh - the joint capital of 
Punjab and Haryana - to Punjab alone. It was agreed in the accord that more contentious 
issues would be resolved later by commissions and future negotiations.11 Longowal was 
assassinated within a month by Sikh militants, but the election proceeded as scheduled in 
September 1985. The Akali Dal, now led by Surjit Singh Barnala, won its first majority 
government and a degree of normalcy returned to the state.  
As the date for the transfer of Chandigarh approached at the end of January 1986, the 
government began to hesitate, fearing a backlash from right-wing Hindus across north 
India, especially in the neighbouring state of Haryana. Ultimately, Chandigarh was not 
transferred on the date stipulated in the accord. The Chief Minister of Punjab, Surjit 
Singh Barnala, instantly became a lame duck and militancy was resuscitated. In April 
1986, militants recaptured the Golden Temple and announced the "formation" of 
"Khalistan." This was the first time that the militants openly declared their separatist 
intentions. In 1987, Barnala was dismissed and President's Rule was re-imposed in 
Punjab.  
After the Longowal accord failed, the centre evidently determined not to accept a 
negotiated settlement, lest they agree to promises under duress that later they might not 
wish to keep. The Punjab crisis certainly ended without a negotiated settlement. The 
government of India decided instead to fight a war of attrition. The government, until 
very recently at least, similarly refused to negotiate a settlement in Kashmir. In spring 
2000, immediately following President Clinton's visit to India, it contacted some militant 
groups about the possibility of conducting peace negotiations.12 On 24 July, the Hizbul 
Mujahideen announced a ceasefire and its intentions to negotiate a settlement with the 
government.13 Other militant organizations opposed the negotiations and sought to thwart 
them by engaging in a series of massacres that left more than 90 people dead.14 The talks 
collapsed within a week, when the Hizbul insisted that the government of Pakistan would 
have to be brought into the process.15 Nevertheless, the government of India announced a 
new ceasefire on 29 November to coincide with Ramadan; it subsequently extended its 
unilateral ceasefire for the month following Ramadan.16 Although winter is typically a 
time for depressed insurgency and counter-insurgency activity, this ceasefire may 
indicate a new willingness by the government of India to negotiate a settlement in 
Kashmir.  
The Indian government, however, is likely responding to the imperatives of geopolitics, 
as opposed to a re-evaluation of its counter-insurgency strategy. While India's decision to 
test nuclear weapons in May 1998 was condemned by the international community, it did 
succeed in focussing world attention on South Asia. Since that time, the United States has 
shifted its foreign policy preferences from Pakistan to India. Pakistan was criticized for 
initiating the Kargil conflict with India in the summer of 1999, and it also lost 
international support after the military coup in October 1999. The United States has also 
been displeased by Pakistan's continued support of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. In 
an effort to exploit Pakistan's current weakness, and to solidify its relations with the 
United States, the government of India has attempted to seize the initiative in Kashmir. 
However, by initially sidelining the democratic government in the state, the government 
must now negotiate with the militants. This is a direct consequence of the government's 
counter-insurgency strategy. The geopolitical significance of the Kashmir conflict likely 
makes this case the exception to the rule. In other words, the government of India is not 
likely to change its general disposition against negotiated settlements in crisis situations 
without geopolitical significance.  
Overwhelming Security Presence and the Geographic Containment of  
Militancy 
If Indian leaders learned to avoid high-profile military confrontations, this did not stop 
them from flooding troubled states with an overwhelming number of security forces - 
regular army, state police, the Central Reserve Police Force and the Border Security 
Force. At the height of Sikh militancy, there were approximately 250,000 security forces 
in Punjab, a state of about 20 million people. Some 400,000-500,000 troops have been 
stationed in Kashmir, a state of only 5 million, although admittedly many of these troops 
are defending the Line of Control with Pakistan, not fighting Kashmiri militants. Indeed, 
the primary objective in both states was to seal the border with Pakistan, which was a 
point of refuge for Sikh militants, as it continues to be for Kashmiri militants. In Pakistan, 
Sikh and Kashmiri militants were safe from the Indian government; they could solicit the 
support of the Pakistan government and it was an excellent place to purchase weapons.17  
While sealing the border with Pakistan was an obvious security objective, non-border 
troops were initially deployed rather haphazardly.18 Sikh militancy was always more 
concentrated in the northwest districts of Amritsar and Gurdaspur, and consequently the 
security forces were deployed so as to contain the insurgency in these areas.19 With the 
Pakistan border sealed on the west, and the mountains of Jammu in the north, the 
militants had nowhere to escape. At this point, it was only a matter of time before the 
militants were eliminated. In Kashmir, the fighting has been contained in the small Vale 
of Kashmir, north of Jammu and west of Ladakh, with the Line of Control in the north 
and west. The mountainous terrain, however, is much more difficult to patrol than the 
plains of Punjab. Nonetheless, the geographic containment of militancy in isolated areas 
has been a crucial aspect of India's counter-insurgency strategy. This strategy, 
furthermore, was congruent with the military's conventional "positional war" 
orientation.20  
Separation of Leaders and Followers  
In Punjab, the security forces initially attempted to squash militancy indiscriminately. 
This did not succeed; it turned every potential militant into an actual militant. In its 
ruthless attempt to capture militants, the police frequently tortured the relatives and 
friends of suspected militants to obtain information on the whereabouts of the suspects. 
For many young men, the choice was to fight or be tortured. Furthermore, captured 
militants were routinely tortured and very often killed. There was thus very little 
incentive for militants to lay down their weapons. This tactic continued until the end of 
1991, when K.P.S. Gill was reappointed as Director-General of the Punjab police.  
After Gill assumed command, the police moved to separate militant leaders from their 
followers. Huge bounties were placed on the heads of leading militants. Rewards of Rs 
25,000 to Rs 100,000 were standard, and a leading militant like Gurbachan Singh 
Manochahal was killed by the police with a three million rupee price on his head,21 as 
compared to the standard police salary of about Rs 2,500 per month. The police suddenly 
became highly motivated to capture senior militants. At the same time as the militant 
leaders were being hunted down, a tacit policy of amnesty, or at least leniency, was 
offered to the rank and file fighters. As senior militants were eliminated one by one, their 
followers could surrender. They were finally given a route out of the quagmire. The 
physical elimination of senior militants and leniency for the "small-fry" thus became 
another element in the counter-insurgency strategy developed by the Indian government.  
The Delegitimation of Militancy  
The Sikh separatist movement was never unified. Moderate Sikh nationalists were riven 
by patron-client networks and egotistical leaders. The militant nationalists were divided 
by personal vendettas from the inception of the movement. The unrelenting suppression 
of the movement instilled further distrust among militants, and caused a rapid 
factionalization among the militants. Over time, the Khalistan movement descended into 
thuggery. The militants increasingly engaged in robbery, extortion, rape, indiscriminate 
killings and ever-escalating terrorist attacks on innocent civilians. By 1991, Sikh 
militants were generally viewed as unprincipled criminal gangs. The brother of a leading 
militant quipped, "the reason that the Khalistan [land of the pure] movement failed was 
because the boys began working towards an Ujadistan (a land of ruin)."22 A similar 
pattern of debauchery and degradation has emerged in Kashmir. It is not clear if this 
moral disintegration was wholly self-inflicted, or if it was aided and abetted by security 
elements operating inside militant groups. While the security forces almost certainly 
infiltrated the militant movement to gather intelligence, the full scope of their activities 
remains largely unknown.23  
A new strategy has been employed in Kashmir: surrendered or captured militants have 
been redeployed by the security forces as counter-insurgents or "friendlies."24 With 3,000 
armed "friendlies" in the state, they are almost as strong as the militants. In Punjab, Gill 
deputized a number of low caste mazhabi Sikhs as "Special Police Officers." This tactic 
was designed as much to neutralize their incentive for joining the militants as it was for 
community protection.25 These "police officers," however, were not former militants; 
indeed, mazhabi Sikhs were frequently the victims of militant attacks. Their loyalty was 
thus assured. In Kashmir, the recruits were initially fickle mercenaries whose allegiances 
switched each time a better offer was directed at them. This was a very risky strategy.  
More recently, at least in the Jammu region of the state, the police have organized 
"village defence committees" (VDCs). The VDCs were initiated in 1995, but in the past 
two years they have mushroomed from 400 units to over 1600 units.26  
Since they are familiar with the area, VDC members have been providing the security 
forces with valuable information on the militants' movements and tactics. Thanks to the 
tips given by villagers, the number of militants killed by the security forces has almost 
doubled in the past year. [Consequently], [e]quipping the VDCs and the special police 
officers (SPOs) is now the top priority for the state police.27  
This community policing program, however, is not without its problems. In particular, the 
scheme seems to have heightened tensions between the Hindu and Muslim communities 
in the region. By and large, the Hindu communities have been receptive to the scheme, 
whereas the Muslim communities remain quite suspicious. Indeed, "there has been a 
persistent demand by local Muslim leaders to disarm the VDCs."28 As such, the village 
defence program is likely to have little chance of success in the predominantly Muslim 
part of Kashmir where the fighting is concentrated.  
The deligitimation of the Khalistan movement was a crucial variable in the termination of 
the Punjab conflict. How much the security forces precipitated this moral decline is 
unclear, but it seems evident that the government is also actively attempting to facilitate 
the factionalization and delegitimation of Kashmiri militancy. However, it is not clear 
that the factionalization of the insurgency makes it easier to contain. It may reduce the 
overall fighting capacity of the movement, and consequently frustrate the primary 
objective of the insurgency, but it may make it more difficult to eliminate the numerous 
fighting units this strategy creates. Many little gangs can inflict considerable damage, 
even if they cannot collectively achieve their objective of separating their respective 
states from India. It also makes a negotiated settlement more difficult because an 
agreement with one group might not be respected by others. Although the tactic is risky, 
it has become a part of India's counter-insurgency strategy.  
Enforced Elections: Punjab  
The Congress government of India went to extraordinary lengths to hold state elections in 
Punjab in February 1992, reversing a long-standing policy of not holding elections in 
disturbed areas. (Elections for the 13 parliamentary seats were held simultaneously.) The 
Punjab elections were originally scheduled to coincide with the general election in May-
June 1991.29 Most militants, however, opposed the election, fearing that it would give 
voice back to democratic Sikh leaders in the Akali Dal, who at that time were effectively 
marginalized. As the June poll approached, the level of violence in the state increased, 
culminating in two train massacres. On the eve of the poll, the Chief Election 
Commissioner cancelled the election, and rescheduled it for September.30  
While the Punjab election was cancelled, the Congress party won the general election, 
despite the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. Narashima Rao, who emerged as the party 
leader after the death of Gandhi, became prime minister. As September approached, the 
new Congress government determined it was not yet ready to hold fresh elections in 
Punjab and pushed the election back again, until February 1992. As February 
approached, the militants once more opposed the prospect of an election and sought to 
thwart it. All of the mainstream factions of the Akali Dal, save one minor group, decided 
resolutely to boycott the poll. The government, however, was determined to hold the 
election. The state was swamped by 750 paramilitary companies and nine army 
divisions,31 comprising some 250,000 troops. Every candidate was assigned at least a 32-
man security detachment.32 The main Akali leaders and several hundred party workers 
were detained under the Terrorism and Anti-Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act to 
ensure that they could not disrupt the election. Under these Orwellian conditions, 
Punjabis were asked to go to the polls. Voter turnout was a meagre 21.6 percent, 
significantly less than a third of the normal Punjabi turnout of about 68 percent. In the 
twelve urban constituencies, the turnout was 38.3 percent, but in the 70 rural 
constituencies, where the militants held greater sway, the turnout was an abysmal 15.1 
percent. In one constituency, the turnout was less than 1 percent.3  
The Congress Party swept to power with rather exaggerated fanfare, given the electoral 
abnormalities. The Congress captured 87 of the state's 117 assembly seats with 43.8 
percent of the vote. In other words, the Congress mandate emanated from less than 10 
percent of the electorate. No other party captured more than nine seats. Beant Singh, an 
old Congress stalwart, was installed as the Chief Minister of the state. Beant Singh was a 
rough-hewn Sikh and, with his signature dark glasses, he was a rather sinister-looking 
individual. Notwithstanding the perversion of democratic norms, the election produced 
the result desired by the Congress government at the centre.  
Beant Singh assumed the officer of Chief Minister just three months after the imposing 
but urbane K.P.S. Gill was reappointed as Director-General of the Punjab Police. Both 
men were Jats, the same caste as the majority of Sikh militants.34 Gill rearmed the police 
and promised his men that he would shoulder all criticisms of police tactics. In short, he 
transformed the police into a disciplined and motivated fighting force.Beant Singh, with 
the support of the central government, gave Gill a free hand to quash militancy in the 
state. The presence of an elected government provided a facade of political normalcy in 
the state and allowed Gill to proceed with his mission without creating the impression 
that Punjab was a police state. The people accepted this charade because they were tired 
of the turmoil and the excesses of the militants. A Sikh journalist wrote in 1994 that 
"[w]hen [the] history of the fight against terrorism comes to be written, Mr. K.P.S. Gill 
could well be judged (by those partial to him) as one who restored order at the expense of 
law. But that seems besides the point now that the basic objective of peace has been 
largely achieved."35 The depravity of the militants may well have been the government's 
saving grace.  
Under Beant Singh, militancy was quelled in Punjab. Beant Singh, however, was 
assassinated on 31 August 1995, by a car bomb placed outside the state secretariat in 
Chandigarh, the capital of Punjab.36 After Singh's death, the Congress government of 
Punjab stumbled along with a succession of hapless Chief Ministers until the state 
election of February 1997, when it was trounced by a resurgent Akali Dal. The voter 
turnout returned to its normal 69 percent. The Akali Dal, led by former Chief Minister 
Parkash Singh Badal, captured 75 seats, while its electoral partners, the Bharatiya Janata 
Party (BJP), won 18 seats. The Congress was reduced to 14 seats.  
The Akali Dal's stunning victory and the Congress Party's ignominious defeat can be 
attributed to a couple of factors. The Congress seems to have paid the price for the 
strong-arm tactics employed by the police and security forces to terminate militancy. The 
near elimination of militancy, however, permitted the moderate Sikh nationalists to return 
to centre stage and it allowed the rural Sikhs to return to the polls. In this sense, the 
Congress was a victim of its own success. But its loss is perhaps more attributable to its 
failures. The fundamental political tensions that existed between Punjab and New Delhi 
in the 1970s were still unresolved. Consequently, the Akali Dal's old political platform 
was just as relevant as it was 20 years earlier. Finally, the national Congress party was no 
longer in power in the centre, and its reputation was in tatters, as its major leaders were 
charged with various counts of corruption. The national party was simply in no position 
to assist its Punjabi colleagues; indeed, it may well have become an electoral liability.  
Gurharpal Singh has argued that the 1992 Punjab election was held "to fulfil a 
constitutional obligation," even if the cost was a "serious erosion of democratic 
legitimacy."37 The elections were no doubt a democratic charade, but they were not held 
to meet a pro forma obligation. There was no legal requirement to hold the election - the 
central government could have continued to rule the state almost indefinitely through the 
emergency provisions of the constitution.38 The purpose of the election was to provide a 
veneer of democratic legitimacy to the otherwise forceful suppression of Sikh militancy. 
While democratic normalcy largely returned to the state with the 1997 election, the 1992 
exercise was nonetheless still a risky strategy.  
Enforced Elections: Kashmir  
By mid-1995, the Congress government in the centre was of the opinion that its election 
strategy in Punjab had been successful, and they began to plan for elections in Kashmir. 
The Vale of Kashmir, however, was more unsettled than Punjab and the people had a 
much greater antipathy toward the government of India. Most Muslim Kashmiris, unlike 
most Sikhs, do not identify themselves as Indian. This makes the Kashmir crisis much 
more intractable and the holding of elections in the state more problematic. Furthermore, 
fraudulent elections, especially the 1987 state poll, are thought to be a cause of militancy 
in Kashmir.39 An enforced election was thus a risky proposition.  
It was decided that elections for the six parliamentary seats would be held prior to the 
state assembly poll. The parliamentary elections were scheduled for May 1996, with the 
state election to be held in October. The conditions in May were so poor that polling for 
the six seats had to be spread out over three days. As with Punjab, the state was flooded 
with security forces, some 950 paramilitary companies and two army divisions, 
representing over 100,000 soldiers. Moreover, about 9,000 Urdu-speaking election 
officials were flown into the state to conduct the elections, with the promise of an extra 
month's salary and a half-million rupee life insurance policy.40
The parliamentary election was boycotted by the National Conference, historically the 
governing party of Kashmir, and by the Hurriyat Conference, the political umbrella of the 
leading militant groups. The militants, as in Punjab, endeavoured to sabotage the 
elections. Without the National Conference, and with militant threats, the people of 
Kashmir - as with Punjab in 1992 - were inclined not to vote. Intelligence assessments for 
the Home Ministry suggested the voter turnout in the Vale of Kashmir could be as low as 
10-20 percent, even worse than the farcical 1992 Punjab poll. Desperate to avoid an 
electoral embarrassment, the government seems to have ordered the police and army to 
ensure a good turnout. There were reports of soldiers moving from village to village with 
voter lists, rousing people to vote and threatening those who resisted.41 This strategy was 
moderately "successful." In the constituencies of Baramulla and Anantnag in the volatile 
Vale of Kashmir, the voter turnout was 35 and 43 percent respectively.42 When the 
ballots were counted, the Congress Party had won two of the three seats in the Vale of 
Kashmir and four of the six in the entire state. The next step was to conduct a state 
assembly poll.  
By the time the state assembly poll was held in October 1996, the political landscape had 
changed dramatically at the centre. The Congress government was soundly defeated in 
the national election in May 1996; the BJP, the largest single party in parliament, was 
unable to form a government; and a thirteen-party coalition, led by the Janata Dal, 
assumed office with H.D. Deve Gowda as Prime Minister. The regional character of this 
motley coalition spawned considerable discussion about the federalization of the Indian 
party system.43 This new climate may have emboldened Farooq Abdullah, the leader of 
the National Conference, to contest the state assembly poll. Abdullah's reputation was 
badly tarnished by allegations of massive electoral fraud in the 1987 state election, but 
his credibility was restored by his boycott of the May 1997 parliamentary poll.  
While the militants and the Hurriyat Conference continued to oppose the election, the 
election proceeded "in what most independent observers concede was a free and fair 
election after the farcical parliamentary poll."44 Voter turn-out ranged from 15 percent in 
some constituencies to as high as 60 percent, and the National Conference swept to 
power, capturing 59 seats in the 87 seat legislature. The Congress was reduced to seven 
seats, and the BJP took eight seats, all in Jammu, indicating a hardening of Hindu 
sentiment in that region of the state. While Farooq Abdullah's campaign for state 
autonomy may have struck a cord with some voters, reports from the state suggest that 
the National Conference's victory does not represent a whole-hearted endorsement of the 
party. Rather, the people may have simply "turned to what they recognized as the only 
credible political force to steer them out of the quagmire."45  
The election of the National Conference in Kashmir has not been a panacea for the 
troubled state, but neither has it been an unmitigated disaster. However, it seems that 
Farooq Abdullah has not taken advantage of his opportunity to capture the hearts and 
minds of the Kashmiri people. Furthermore, it would appear that the people of Kashmir 
have grown disillusioned with the democratic process. In the March 1998 federal 
election, voter turn-out in Srinagar was 30 percent; in the September 1999 federal 
election, voter turnout in the state capital dropped dramatically to 11 percent.46 The 
electorate was almost certainly fearful of the resurgence of militancy in the summer of 
1999 (see below), but they may also have come to the conclusion that the electoral 
process has not brought a solution to the troubled state. In the last four elections, the 
people have taken serious risks when they voted. The electoral calculus may now be that 
the weak return for voting does not warrant taking the risks of voting. In sum, "[d]espite 
three years of popular - at least nominally - government, the level of confidence among 
the people is abysmally low."47
The final stage of India's counter-insurgency strategy is the holding of enforced elections. 
The government moves to this stage when it feels confident it has gained the upper hand 
on the battlefield. The strategy appeared to be "successful" in Punjab, but this might owe 
more to the fact that the partisan interests of the Congress governments of Punjab and 
India coincided. The same alignment of party interests does not exist between the centre 
and Kashmir. The strategy thus does not seem to be as successful in Kashmir as it was in 
Punjab.  
COUNTER-INSURGENCY IN INDIA RECONSIDERED  
Militancy has essentially been eradicated from Punjab, while the situation has been 
complicated in Kashmir by a large number of foreign mercenaries. In this sense, India's 
counter-insurgency strategy might be considered partially "successful." On the other 
hand, the strategy has had large social, economic and political costs. These counter-
insurgency campaigns have exacted a heavy death toll. They have severely undermined 
the economic well-being of many families and retarded the economic development of the 
affected states. This strategy, furthermore, may not be appropriate in other states; it is not 
even clear that it was wholly successful in either Punjab or Kashmir. India's counter-
insurgency strategy has been fundamentally apolitical. It has entailed serious violations of 
human rights, and it may have disturbed civil-military relations. Finally, these counter-
insurgency campaigns may have weakened the democratic legitimacy of the Indian state.  
The Human and Economic Cost of Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency  
India's counter-insurgency strategy is premised on the assumption that a large state will 
eventually prevail over a small secessionist movement. The assumption is perhaps not 
incorrect, but there are large costs associated with such a strategy. The government of 
India has engaged in two successive wars of attrition. The death toll has been staggering. 
Over 50,000 people have been killed in Punjab and Kashmir combined. As Punjab and 
Kashmir are relatively small states, this high death rate has affected most villages and 
many families. Furthermore, since many of the victims were young men, many families 
have lost important breadwinners. 
Each of these wars has dragged on for at least ten years at tremendous economic cost. In 
summer 1997, I. K. Gujral, the short-lived prime minister of India, forgave Punjab's debt 
of Rs 8,500 crores (about 3 billion USD), accumulated combatting militancy since 
1984.48 This was just the state government's debt; the central government would have 
assumed additional costs for its own counter-insurgency efforts. Similar costs will also 
have been incurred in Kashmir, perhaps even greater costs given the isolation of the state, 
difficult terrain and harsh (winter) climate.  
There was also significant economic dislocation in each case. Punjab has remained the 
wealthiest state in India per capita but it is impossible to estimate how much investment 
the state lost during its "troubles." Punjab is still highly dependent on agriculture; its 
industrial development lags behind Gujarat and Maharashtra, the second and third richest 
states in the country. Kashmir, a rather impoverished state, has been decimated by the 
almost total collapse of tourism, formerly the state's primary industry. In each state, 
thousands of young men, participants who were not killed, have had their economic 
potential seriously depreciated by these decade-long conflicts. The social malaise that has 
pervaded each state has had incalculable human and economic costs.  
Limited Utility of India's Counter-Insurgency Strategy  
The Indian government has had to expend considerable energy combatting relatively 
small insurgencies in two of the country's smaller, landlocked, states. Indeed, militancy 
has been largely confined in each case to two or three districts. Militancy peaked in each 
state with no more than 6,000 lightly armed insurgents.49 In each case, however, the 
government was required to deploy about 250,000 security forces, and still the 
disturbance has not been quelled in Kashmir. Furthermore, as the Punjab and Kashmir 
conflicts overlapped, half a million forces were engaged simultaneously in two internal 
disputes, leaving India's external defences vulnerable.  
It is hard to imagine that India's counter-insurgency strategy would be successful in one 
of the country's larger states, especially a coastal state. Tamil Nadu, for example, has a 
population four or five times that of Punjab and a long coast line. A separatist insurgency 
in this state could not be defeated with the same tactics employed in Punjab or Kashmir. 
The Indian Army learned this lesson with its ill-fated peace-making mission to Sri Lanka 
in 1987.  
Limited Success of the Strategy 
It is not clear, in fact, how successful India's counter-insurgency strategy has been in 
either Punjab or Kashmir. The conflict in Kashmir continues, although perhaps 
perpetuated by foreign mercenaries.50 In early 1997, there were still more than 3,500 
armed militants in the state.351 The presence of foreign fighters in Kashmir stands in 
contrast to the case in Punjab. Since 1991, as many as 1,380 foreign mercenaries have 
been killed in Kashmir by the security forces, and another 142 have been arrested.52 It 
was estimated that 1,500 foreign mercenaries were operating in the state in the last few 
years,53 and it is speculated that as many more have crossed into Kashmir since summer 
1999.54  
By all accounts, the crisis has escalated dramatically since the conflict with Pakistan in 
summer 1999. The government of India has reported that in the months following the 
clash with Pakistan, the number of violent incidents in Kashmir increased by 27 percent, 
"and attacks against the security forces by 95 percent."55 In July 1999, militants in 
Kashmir launched their first suicide mission in the state, following the example of 
Hizballah in Lebanon and Israel, as well as of the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka.56 This trend 
apparently continued throughout 1999, as militants "aimed at chipping away the morale 
of security forces."57 The militants, furthermore, have continued their offensive into the 
winter, unlike previous years.58
The successful hijacking of an Indian Airlines flight in December 2000 almost certainly 
raised the morale of the militants in Kashmir.59 Two of the prisoners released in exchange 
for the hostages have surfaced in Pakistan and devoted themselves anew to the liberation 
of Kashmir. Maulana Masood Azhar, who is often described as a Muslim cleric from 
Pakistan, is the purported leader of the Harkat-ul-Ansar, an umbrella organization of the 
groups fighting for the separation of Kashmir from India. The hijackers also secured the 
release of Mushtaq Ahmed Zargar, alias Latram, who was the leader of the Al Umar 
Mujahideen, one of the original militant groups in Kashmir.60 It is suspected that these 
groups have links to Osama bin Laden. Indeed, bin Laden reportedly has declared that 
"India and America are now our biggest enemies . . . all mujahideen groups in Pakistan 
should come together to target India . . . we are always ready to help the Kashmiri 
mujahideen."61 It is now feared that "bin Laden's jihad may revive the ideological basis of 
Kashmiri militancy."62 Indeed, it was reported in early 2000 that as many as 500 youth 
had crossed into Pakistan for training.63  
In the post-Kargil, post-Kandahar period, it appears that India's counter-insurgency 
strategy "is fast spinning out of control."64 Indeed, the ability of militants to strike 
seemingly at will has created "the impression that they are more in control than the 
government."65 India now faces two fundamental problems. First, the insurgency in 
Kashmir is deeply entrenched. This will have to be solved politically as well as militarily. 
But, second, this is no longer simply a domestic problem. The government of India has 
long resisted "internationalizing" the question of Kashmir, inasmuch as it does not want 
this issue solved by the United Nations or actors outside the region. However, it would 
now appear that India will not be able to resolve the situation in Kashmir without a peace 
settlement with the government of Pakistan. Indeed, as one Indian observer has noted, 
"Pakistan is not only a party to the Kashmir dispute, it is now a party in Kashmir as 
well."66 Thus, from an Indian perspective, the greatest failure of the government's 
counter-insurgency strategy in Kashmir may be that it will be forced to make serious 
compromises in its relations with Pakistan.  
Peace has largely returned to Punjab, but militant elements remain in the state and 
abroad. In fact, as late as 1997, the state was rocked by relatively frequent bomb attacks, 
including a train bomb which killed 38 people.67 Furthermore, half a dozen small bombs 
were detonated in and around Delhi in October and November 1997, leaving at least 
seven people dead. While 1998 was relatively calm in Punjab, there were fears that 
militant groups were re-activating in 1999. In January and February 1999, a number of 
explosions occurred around the state.68  
India Today, citing anonymous intelligence sources, has claimed that about 300 militants, 
including two-dozen hardcore terrorists, were operating in Punjab in 1997.69 Most of 
these militants were not on police lists, which have not been updated since 1993.70 
Moreover, militant groups are now making a concerted effort to recruit religiously 
motivated youth who do not have criminal records.71 The situation is further confused by 
the byzantine array of militant factions. At least nine groups were known to exist in 1997, 
ranging in size from 10 to 50 people.72 New militant tactics have confounded a rather 
demoralized police force. These groups appear to be much more clandestine than they 
used to be. They are organized with a more rigorous and compartmentalized cell structure 
such that the relatively few militants still operating in India are not known to each other. 
Furthermore, these groups have tended not to claim responsibility for their attacks, so as 
not to provide any clues for the police.  
It seems that operations are now planned abroad by groups like the Babbar Khalsa 
International and the International Sikh Youth Federation but carried out by affiliated 
groups in India. The Babbar Khalsa tends to recruit from the community of illegal 
immigrants in the west and returns them to India with the necessary training and financial 
resources to continue the movement.73 It is reported that the Babbar Khalsa, and other 
Khalistani militant groups, are supported by as many as 5,000 sympathizers living in at 
least 20 countries around the world. Most of the Khalistan militant groups also allegedly 
have operatives in Pakistan, where they have reportedly forged alliances with various 
Kashmiri separatist groups. The highly pluralistic region of Jammu, wedged between 
Punjab and Kashmir along the Pakistan border, has also become a significant operational 
base in India for both Kashmiri and Sikh militants.  
Thus, seven years after militancy was thought to have been eradicated from Punjab, the 
police find themselves playing a cat-and-mouse game with an ever more elusive enemy. 
K.P.S. Gill, who thought he had won the battle against militancy, stated flatly in 1997, 
"there is no way we can stop terrorism from returning to Punjab."74 This sad development 
is probably more attributable to the political failure of India's counter-insurgency strategy 
rather than any military shortcomings.  
Failure to Address Underlying Political Issues  
The long-term structural causes of militancy in Punjab and Kashmir are complex and 
vigorously debated.75 While it may have been difficult for the government of India to 
foresee the underlying causes of militancy, it must accept responsibility for ignoring 
long-standing grievances in each state. These grievances stoked the fires of political 
unrest. While state politicians frequently raised their grievances with central authorities, 
they were repeatedly rebuffed. The state politicians consequently had nothing to show for 
their efforts, and thus were forced to return to their constituency empty-handed. It is little 
wonder that alienated youth lost patience with their traditional leadership and resolved to 
pursue a more radical course.  
In Punjab, the Akali Dal presented a list of 45 demands in 1981.76 Two issues were at the 
core of these demands - the transfer of Chandigarh and other territorial adjustments, and 
the division of waterways between Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan.77 Rajiv Gandhi 
promised to transfer Chandigarh to Punjab in January 1986, as part of his agreement with 
Sant Longowal, but he failed to deliver on his promise. Indeed, none of the salient aspects 
of the Longowal Accord came to fruition.78 Four years after the end of armed hostilities, 
no progress has been made on any of these issues. The proximate causes of militancy in 
Punjab thus still exist. If the Akali government of Punjab is again unable to make 
progress on these issues with the centre, it may once again lose support in the Sikh 
community and open the door for renewed militancy. The Akali leaders did not help 
themselves with their incessant squabbling in 1999.79  
A similar pattern is evident in Kashmir. The fundamental issue concerns Kashmir's 
constitutional relationship to India. As a former princely state of British India, the 
Maharaja of Kashmir was required only to cede the powers of defence, foreign affairs 
and communications to the government of India, as stipulated in Article 370 of the 
Constitution. Sheikh Abdullah, the leader of the National Conference, refused to join 
India's Constituent Assembly and he attempted instead to negotiate a special status for 
Kashmir in India based on the terms of accession. Nehru tired of Abdullah's 
tenaciousness and orchestrated his downfall in 1953. The new leader of the National 
Conference, Baskhi Gulam Muhammad, quickly reached a constitutional agreement with 
the central government. Muhammad's 1953 agreement with the central government 
considerably reduced Kashmir's autonomy inherent in the terms of accession, although it 
still provided Kashmir with more autonomy than the other states in the Union.80  
Over the next 40 years, the autonomy of Kashmir was eroded further as the Indian 
government attempted to integrate the state into the Union on the same terms as the other 
states, contrary to the provisions in Article 370. After nearly a decade of bitter political 
conflict in the state, there is no indication that the government of India is ready to respect 
the provisions of Article 370. While the Janata Dal coalition was potentially more 
sympathetic to regional concerns than the other major parties, it did not restore the spirit 
of Article 370 during its term of office. On the other hand, the BJP government has not 
moved to eliminate Article 370 since it came to power in 1997, as it threatened to do 
when it existed in opposition.  
Farooq Abdullah and the National Conference won the 1996 state election largely as a 
result of his promise to negotiate autonomy from New Delhi. Abdullah's inability to 
obtain autonomy from the centre threatens his fragile legitimacy. In early 2000, Abdullah 
renewed his efforts. He declared threateningly, "[i]f Jammu and Kashmir has to remain a 
part of India, autonomy has to be given. It's better the Centre start thinking that this has to 
happen to win the hearts of the people. They can dismantle me but the issue of autonomy 
will not disappear."81 However, it is exceedingly unlikely that the BJP government will 
accede to these demands.82 The underlying political issue in Kashmir thus remains 
unchanged, and the alienation of the Kashmiri people continues unabated.83 Indeed, the 
alienation in the state may have deepened over the past decade as a result of the central 
government's oppressive counter-insurgency strategy. Once again, this strategy has failed 
to eliminate the root cause of militancy.  
India's counter-insurgency strategy is decidedly apolitical: it assumes that militancy can 
be eliminated by force. Militancy in Punjab and Kashmir, however, has been politically 
motivated and as such it requires a political solution. Without a political solution, the 
long term prospects for peace appear tenuous, especially in Kashmir. While the political 
dynamics in Kashmir are much more explosive than they were in Punjab, the Akali Dal 
also requires a political settlement to ensure that it is not outflanked by militants in the 
future. While India's counter-insurgency strategy is apolitical, it has had political 
consequences. It has precipitated a delegitimation of the police, a weakening of civil-
military relations and an erosion of India's democratic traditions.  
Human Rights Violations and the Delegitimation of the Police 
When K.P.S. Gill was reappointed as the Director-General of the Punjab police, it seems 
that there was at least a tacit understanding with the central government that human rights 
violations would be part of the price to pay for the restoration of order in Punjab. The 
Punjab police have been repeatedly accused of staging "fake encounters" with militants. 
There were also frequent accusations that militants were captured, tortured and then 
executed. Human rights violations similarly have been ignored in Kashmir. The 
government of India simply ignored these complaints, and it repeatedly refused to permit 
international human rights organizations to enter the country.  
This wilful neglect of human rights may well return to haunt the government of India. In 
the 1980s, a number of Sikh intellectuals chose to advance the Khalistan cause by 
establishing human rights organizations. These organizations have been very adept at 
exploiting human rights violations to embarrass the government of India, both 
domestically and internationally. While the conflict has subsided on the battlefield, it 
seems that "Punjab Part Two" will be fought in the courts. Instead of AK-47s, the 
"litigation gun" is now firmly trained on the police.84
Over 1,000 writ petitions have been logged against the police with the Punjab and 
Haryana courts, involving more than 2,000 police personnel. At present, "[t]hirty 
policemen are in jail, around 100 are out on bail and 140, including seven 
[superintendents], are facing prosecution."85 There are also 85 active investigations 
against the Punjab police being pursued by the Central Bureau of Investigation and 91 
judicial probes, including "cases involving partially identified or unidentified bodies, 
mass cremations, and disappearances from police custody."86 A senior police officer fears 
that "[n]o less than one-sixth of the 70,000 strong force may find itself in the dock."87 For 
a police force that "suffered 1,700 casualties between 1978 and 1993 and lost 800 family 
members in the war to keep Punjab in India, this seems like ingratitude at its worst."88  
The previous Congress government of Punjab funded a large war chest to provide the 
police with the best legal representation possible. The new Akali Dal administration is 
not as keen to protect the police, given the rather low esteem in which the force is viewed 
in the Sikh community. The Punjab Advocate General, G.S. Grewal, has said only that 
"[o]nce they are exonerated, the state is not averse to reimbursing the legal expenses 
incurred by the policemen."89 The national Congress party is obviously no longer in a 
position to provide the police with immunity. While the Indian courts are notoriously 
slow, there is potential for the moral fabric of the police to unravel. The lower ranks, 
which cannot afford expensive legal council, may find it preferable to testify against their 
commanding officers rather than risk prosecution.90  
India, however, cannot afford to have the police command structure collapse. India is a 
highly volatile, diverse, developing society. Political disturbances are certain to be a 
recurring feature of the Indian landscape, and the security forces will be asked again to 
contain such movements. In defence of his force, K.P.S. Gill, now retired, has argued, "a 
mechanism must be found to obviate the legal harassment of those who put their lives at 
stake during low-intensity conflicts . . .. Otherwise, who is going to fight terrorism 
tomorrow?"91 Criminal immunity for human rights violations, however, is not the 
solution. Counter-insurgency efforts must be conducted within the letter and spirit of the 
law and under firm civilian political command. India's counter-insurgency strategy, 
which has relied on excessive force and disregard for human rights, is not sustainable in a 
political democracy, with constitutionally guaranteed liberties and an open legal system.  
Civil-Military Relations 
The Indian army, almost uniquely in the Third World, has remained under firm civilian 
control since independence. Rajesh Rajagopalan has noted that the Indian army 
developed its counter-insurgency doctrine during the conflict in Nagaland in the 1950s. 
He suggests that the main points of the doctrine include limits on the use of force, 
isolation of insurgents from the general population, military dominance of insurgency-
affected areas and superiority of numbers.92 Although the army has engaged in a number 
of counter-insurgency operations since that time, it has not fundamentally revised its 
counter-insurgency doctrine. In short, the army does not seem to have responded to the 
modernization of insurgency movements, with their significantly improved weapons and 
communications equipment for the insurgents, and significant external support for the 
enemy, in the form of both regional sanctuary and international support networks. In 
short, the military has maintained its conventional "positional-war" orientation.  
While India suffered a humiliating defeat against China in 1962, the Indian military 
performed admirably in conflicts with Pakistan in 1948, 1965 and especially the 1971 
liberation of Bangladesh. The military thus developed a certain prestige in Indian society. 
The military has not engaged in an external war since 1971, notwithstanding the skirmish 
with Pakistan in summer 1999, but it has been employed frequently to suppress domestic 
uprisings. Between 1951 and 1970, the army was asked to suppress domestic strife on 
476 occasions. By contrast, the military engaged in 433 domestic situations between June 
1979 and 1984. "Most of these interventions were limited and . . . [i]n this sense, the 
military has acted in support of the political structure, providing the ultimate force in 
situations in which political solutions had failed and in which the police could not 
cope."93 The increased deployment of the military for domestic peacekeeping has 
lowered its prestige in society, disturbed ethnic relations in the military and strained 
relations between senior military officers and civilian authorities.  
The Indian military is a social institution. It is composed of individuals drawn from 
India's diverse communities. India's diversity is thus mirrored in the military, to a greater 
or lesser degree. When the military is asked to suppress a community-based insurgency, 
it is bound to disturb members of that community in the military. Soldiers are not 
divorced from their community and, if a counter-insurgency effort steps beyond 
eliminating terrorists to attacking the community or its cherished institutions, a soldier's 
loyalty may be called into question. The Punjab crisis is illustrative of this problem.  
The Sikh community was regarded as the backbone of the British Indian army. While 
Sikhs only composed about 2 percent of India's population, the military was 25 percent 
Sikh at independence. Although the officer corps is still about 20 percent Sikh, the 
overall figure has dropped to about 12 percent, much to the consternation of Sikh 
political leaders. Sikhs in the military are as loyal as any other soldier, and they had little 
or no sympathy for the separatists in their community, but Operation Bluestar severely 
tested the loyalty of many Sikh soldiers.94 Even K.P.S. Gill has said bluntly, "No one 
defends Bluestar. It was a grave mistake and everyone, every Sikh had the same reaction. 
There was a sense of outrage. Even I had it."95  
Three of the key generals who planned Bluestar were Sikh, as were four of the six 
battalion commanders who participated in the operation, and a fair number of Sikh troops 
were also involved.96 The President of India, the constitutional Commander-in-Chief of 
the military, was also a Sikh. These loyal soldiers were instantly regarded as pariahs in 
their own community, and they lived with the threat of terrorist retaliation after the 
operation. Indeed, General A.S. Vaidya, who commanded Operation Bluestar, was 
assassinated on 10 August 1986, six months after he retired from active duty.97 And 
President Giani Zail Singh was struck by a bullet when he toured the Golden Temple in 
the aftermath of the operation.  
As news of the operation spread across India, over 2,500 Sikh recruits deserted the army 
in a desperate attempt to defend the Golden Temple.98 Operation Bluestar placed every 
Sikh soldier in a moral quandary: they were asked to submerge their cultural identity for 
the sake of professional duty. Stephen Cohen has argued,  
the Punjab crisis had one unprecedented impact upon the Indian armed forces. Given the 
evidence of the mutinies that occurred in June 1984, the temporary alienation of retired 
Sikh officers, and the close links between Sikhs in and out of the military, one can 
assume that no Sikh unit was fully trusted, especially in a situation that involved the 
Punjab itself . . .. The overall integrity of the Indian armed forces, especially the army, 
may have been badly, if temporarily, weakened.99  
The stress placed on the military's delicate ethnic composition during counter-insurgency 
operations is yet another reason to pursue political settlements to these problems.  
The deployment of the military for counter-insurgency duty also strains the relations 
among senior military commanders and the political decision makers. The Indian military 
regards its primary task as the defence of India from external aggression, but "[a] third 
and occasionally more of the army is employed on internal security duties."100 India and 
Pakistan share a long border, much of it over flat land with large civilian populations 
nearby. A large contingent of soldiers is thus required to guard the border. Furthermore, 
the defence of the isolated borders with China also requires an enormous logistical effort. 
The military regards domestic counter-insurgency duty as an unnecessary diversion from 
its primary task.101 The military has thus increasingly asserted that domestic insurgencies 
require political resolutions.102 Indeed, Lieutenant-General J.R. Mukherjee, commander 
of the 15th Corps in Kashmir, stated in July 2000, "I think it has been accepted by all that 
ultimately there would have to be a political solution" to the crisis in Kashmir.103  
The military's engagement in counter-insurgency places it in the middle of a political 
conflict between the centre and the disaffected region. As the military is necessarily an 
instrument of the centre, it stands to lose social prestige in disturbed regions. The military 
may well resent this loss of public support, especially if the political maladroitness of the 
centre has caused or perpetuated the conflict. Cohen has observed, "[s]ervice resentment 
over political incompetence, especially when that incompetence affects the conduct of 
war or the readiness of the military to fight a war, runs deep . . .. The armed forces, 
especially the army, are not passive observers of the deterioration and increasing 
lawlessness of Indian politics."104 With all of the problems and crises facing the 
government of India, it can ill-afford a disgruntled military. Cohen has cautioned that the 
obedience of the military to civilian authority "will continue only so long as that authority 
is regarded as legitimate."105 And therein lies the greatest danger of India's erstwhile 
counter-insurgency strategy.  
Democracy in India  
India's legitimacy is derived from its democratic traditions, which are rare among Third 
World states. Indeed, India's democratic history is more in keeping with western political 
traditions. Furthermore, the military in India has been wholly subservient to civilian 
authority. While India's security forces may be able to ensure the compliance of the 
population, the continued "use of force to suppress dissent, resolve social conflicts, and 
maintain order may lead to the erosion of legitimacy and undermine the capacity of the 
state to rule."106 As Noorani notes, furthermore, "[d]emocracy is in peril when 
intelligence agencies mould policy and political decisions."107 V.R. Raghavan has noted 
that "India's central paramilitary forces have expanded four times and more in the last 20 
years." He continues, "that the Indian state is required to use such a large force, in an 
armed role against its own citizens, should be a sobering thought."108 Raghavan also 
laments that all too often the central and state governments have been content to allow 
large portions of the country to be essentially governed by the military and paramilitary 
forces. Rajni Kothari has described the trend toward police rule and authoritarianism as 
"the state against democracy."109  
India's democracy is now under enormous strain. The fragmentation of the party system, 
unstable coalition governments, dubious exploitation of the constitution, massive graft 
and political corruption, the criminalization of politics and the general decay of many 
institutions have left many Indians deeply suspicious and distrustful of the political 
system. A pervasive cynicism has taken root across India, especially in highly disaffected 
states, such as Punjab and Kashmir. The citizens of Punjab and Kashmir first witnessed 
the dismissal of their democratically-elected governments. They then endured a decade of 
police rule followed by sham elections. The governments elected by these charades were 
the political puppets of New Delhi, not the representatives of the people. It would not be 
surprising if the citizens of these states have had their belief in democracy shaken and 
their faith in the central government diminished. A similar process of state delegitimation 
has occurred in Assam and the micro-states of the northeast frontier.  
CONCLUSION 
Punjab and Kashmir are relatively small states on the periphery of India. The country 
may well endure these crises, but it can ill-afford more crises. The government of India 
cannot alienate large portions of the population in successive states, if it wishes to 
maintain its legitimacy. The repeated use of the counter-insurgency strategy developed in 
Punjab and Kashmir could well undermine the democratic fabric of India. The long-term 
erosion of the political legitimacy of the Indian state is the real danger of India's counter-
insurgency strategy.  
India will likely suffer more separatist insurgencies in the years ahead. It is thus 
imperative that an effective counter-insurgency strategy be developed that avoids the 
pitfalls encountered by the efforts in Punjab and Kashmir. Force will undoubtedly be a 
part of this strategy, but it must conform to the letter and spirit of the law, if it is to obtain 
public acceptance. The frequent use of excessive force - extra-judicial executions and 
torture - has serious costs, in the short, medium and long-term. In the short-term, it 
enrages the local population and fuels militancy; in the medium term, it exposes the 
police to damaging legal suits, the possible unravelling of the command structure, the 
demoralization of the police and a possible reluctance to fight future insurgencies; in the 
long-term, it may cause the erosion of the state's political legitimacy.  
India's erstwhile counter-insurgency strategy has been based overwhelmingly on the use 
of force; it has been almost wholly apolitical. The government of India has steadfastly 
ignored the political grievances that cause such crises. All too often, legitimate political 
issues have been allowed to fester. This leads only to greater complications. The Indian 
state must win back the hearts and minds of its disaffected populations instead of simply 
trying to enforce compliance. Winning the confidence of the people is the only real long-
term solution to these protracted crises.  
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